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Acting on the tip, Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale Police Department determined the Gates' current address and learned that Lance Gates had made a May fifth airplane reservation to West Palm Beach, Florida. 9 An agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency monitored the flight. Subsequently, federal agents in Florida reported that they had observed Lance Gates arrive in West Palm Beach, take a taxi to a nearby hotel, and go to a room registered to Susan Gates. The next morning Lance Gates and an unidentified woman left the hotel in a car bearing Illinois license plates issued to Lance Gates and drove north on 7 Id. at 2321.
Id. at 2325. The letter stated:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates Greenway in Condominiums Id.
9 Id.
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an interstate frequently used by travelers to Chicago.' 0 Mader presented a signed affidavit containing the foregoing facts together with a copy of the anonymous letter to a judge of the Circuit Court of DuPage County. Based thereon, the judge issued a search warrant for the Gates' house and automobile."
When the Gates returned home, the Bloomingdale police were waiting. They searched the trunk of the Gates' car and found approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of the Gates' home revealed marijuana, weapons, and other contraband.' 2 The couple was indicted for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver and with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 13 The Illinois Circuit Court ordered that all the items discovered be suppressed on the ground that the search violated the fourth amendment because the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that the Gates' automobile and house contained the discovered items. 1 4 Both the Illinois Appellate Court' 5 and the Illinois Supreme Court' 6 affirmed the suppression of the evidence.
III. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
After receiving the briefs and hearing the oral arguments in Gates, the Supreme Court requested the parties to submit additional briefs specifically addressing whether the exclusionary rule' 7 should permit a good-faith exception for evidence obtained by police in a search and seizure which they reasonably believed to be valid under the fourth amendment. 18 The Court, however, decided not to rule on the good- 
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TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 1253 may be based on hearsay information, the magistrate must be informed of both the circumstances supporting the informant's allegations (the basis-of-knowledge prong) and the circumstances demonstrating the informant's credibility (the veracity prong) 26 The magistrate in Aguilar had issued a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit which stated that police officers had "received reliable information from a credible person" that the petitioner possessed drugs.
2 7 The Supreme Court noted that a magistrate cannot base a determination of probable cause on conclusory statements or on an affiant's belief alone, 28 and found the affidavit defective because neither the officers nor their informant had alleged in the affidavit that they had personal knowledge of the information. 2 9 Thus, the Court concluded that the affidavit did not contain sufficient information to enable the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's conclusions and make a proper determination of probable cause.
30
In Spinelli, the Court expanded the Aguilar test to cover affidavits which contained information partially corroborating an informant's tip.
3 1 The Court held that in evaluating such an affidavit, the magistrate must first measure the informant's report against the Aguilar standards to assess its probative value. If the tip is inadequate underAguilar, the magistrate must examine the corroborating information to determine if probable cause exists. 32 The corroborated tip, however, must be as trustworthy as a tip that would pass the Aguilar test without corrobo- 'Whereas said Francis B. Laughlin has stated under his oath that he has cause to suspect and does believe that certain merchandise, to wit: Certain liquors of foreign origin a more particular description of which cannot be given, upon which the duties have not been paid, or which has otherwise been brought into the United States contrary to law, and that said merchandise is now deposited and contained within the premises of J.J. Nathanson. .. ' 
Id. at 44 (quoting Affidavit).
29 378 U.S. at 113. 3 0 Id. at 113-14.
31 393 U.S. at 415. In Spineli, FBI agents received information from an informant that Spinelli was engaged in gambling activities. The agents submitted an affidavit for a search warrant which, in addition to the tip, contained allegations that the agents had observed Spinelli going to and from an apartment in St. Louis which the telephone company said contained two telephones. The agents also stated that they were aware of Spinelli's general reputation for gambling. Id. at 413-14. The Court applied theAguilar test and found that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to issue a search warrant. Id. at 418.
32 Id. at 415.
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ration. 33 If the affidavit fails to adequately set forth the informant's basis of knowledge, the tip nevertheless may be so detailed that the magistrate may reasonably infer that the information was based on the informant's personal knowledge. 34 In People v. Gates, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the twopronged test and found that Detective Mader's affidavit failed both the basis-of-knowledge and veracity prongs. 35 The court found that the anonymous tip failed the basis-of-knowledge prong because it did not indicate that the information was based on the informant's personal knowledge. 36 The court concluded that the tip also failed the veracity prong because the informant's anonymity prevented the court from determining the informant's credibility or the tip's reliability.
3 7 The court then stated that the corroborated information in the letter was insufficiently detailed for the magistrate to infer that the tip was based on the informant's personal knowledge. 38 Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the evidence corroborated by the police, including the verification of the Gates' address and travel plans, was of clearly innocent activity. 39 The court held that corroboration of innocent activity was insufficient to establish probable 36 Id. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 890. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that although the informant had stated that the Gates had boasted of their illegal activities, the court could not determine whether they had made that statement directly to the informant. Similarly, while the letter said that the Gates had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement, no statement demonstrated that the informant had seen the drugs or was told about them. Thus, the court concluded that the letter contained mere conclusions. Id. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 890.
37 Id. at 384-86, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that, although the identity of the informant need not be revealed, the credibility requirement was usually satisfied by the police officer relating prior instances in which the officer had obtained information from the informant that had resulted in arrests and convictions. In Gates, however, no one knew the informant's identity. Id. at 384-85, 423 N.E.2d at 891. 38 Id. at 386-89, 423 N.E.2d at 892-93. The court applied the concept of "self-verifying" detail which the Supreme Court had developed in Spineli. See supra text accompanying note 34; infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
The court limited the use of self-verifying detail to satisfying the basis-of-knowledge prong and found that naming the street where the Gates lived and stating that the Gates would be driving from Florida in early May with drugs in their car did not meet the specificity required to establish probable cause. Id. at 389, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
39 Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893. The court noted that "Mader's independent investigation revealed only that Lance and Susan Gates lived on Greenway Drive; that Lance Gates booked passage on a flight to Florida; that upon arriving he entered a room registered to his wife; and that he and his wife left the hotel together by car." Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893. 40 Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567 (1971)) (additional information acquired by police officers must in some sense be corroborative of the informer's tip that the suspects committed or were in the process of committing a felony).
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION Writing for the majority in Gates, Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the totality of the circumstances test for determining whether an informant's tip can establish probable cause. 41 He stated that the totality of the circumstances test was far more consistent with the Court's prior treatment of probable cause than the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 42 While he acknowledged that an informant's veracity, reliability, or basis of knowledge may be relevant in determining whether probable cause exists, Justice Rehnquist concluded that these concerns are better understood in the balancing approach of a totality of the circumstances test. 43 Justice Rehnquist expressed concern over the difficulty faced by nonlawyer magistrates in applying the complex set of analytical and evidentiary rules that had developed under the Agul/ar-Spinelli test.4 He reasoned that a common sense totality of the circumstances approach would help alleviate this problem. 45 In addition, because of the fourth amendment's strong preference for warrants and the Supreme Court's traditional discouragement of de novo review of probable cause findings, Justice Rehnquist determined that the fourth amendment required only that a reviewing court find that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would reveal evidence of a crime before issuing a search warrant. 46 The magistrate's action cannot, however, be "ca mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. ' 
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1256 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 74 injustices. 49 He also suggested that hypertechnical inspection of warrants by the courts with the two-pronged test encouraged police to engage in warrantless searches with the hope of later relying on one of the exceptions to the Warrant Clause to justify their search.
50
Justice Rehnquist also reasoned that the Aguilar-Spinelli test interfered with law enforcement because anonymous tips would rarely survive its scrutiny. 51 Noting the important role that such tips have played in solving crime, he concluded that "[w]hile a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants is not. ' 52 Justice Rehnquist admitted that, unsupported, the anonymous letter in Gates was inadequate to establish probable cause even under the totality of the circumstances test.
5 3 Therefore, he examined the police corroboration to determine whether the corroboration of the letter was sufficient to establish the necessary probable cause. Justice Rehnquist noted that the corroborated details such as the flight to Florida, the brief overnight stay, and the immediate return to Chicago were indicative of 1959) . In Draper, a known informant told federal agents that Draper would arrive in Denver by train on either September eighth or ninth and that he would be carrying three ounces of heroin. The informant also supplied a detailed description of Draper and the clothes he would be wearing. The informant said that Draper would be carrying a "tan zipper bag" and walking "real fast." Id. at 309. On September ninth, police observed a man matching Draper's description alight from a train and walk rapidly towards the exit. His clothing and luggage exactly matched the informant's description. Id. at 309-10. The Court noted that the police had "personally verified every facet of the information given [them]... except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag." Id. at 313. Thus, the Court held the arrest lawful and concluded that, based on the details in the tip and the police corroboration, the agents had probable cause to believe that Draper had committed a narcotics violation. Id. at 314. 56 103 S. Ct. at 2334. Justice Rehnquist noted that the police had corroborated the informant's predictions that the Gates' car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that the Gates would immediately return to Bloomingdale. He concluded that "[i]t is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 'corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing a 'substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.'" Id. at 2335 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960)). 57 Id. at 2335 n.13, quoting Joint Appendix at 12a, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) . See infia notes 81-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of corroboration of innocent activity.
58 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.3. 59 Id. Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts." Id. 60 Id. at 2335. 61 Id. at 2335 n.14. Although the anonymous letter had said that Susan Gates would drive to Florida and then fly back to Illinois, the affidavit reported that she drove back with her husband. Id. at 2325-26. guide magistrates' probable cause determinations. 70 Finally, Justice Brennan feared that, as Justice White had suggested, the totality of the circumstances test would lead to an "evisceration" of the probable cause standard. 71 He warned that the majority's opinion demonstrated "an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment." 72 
VI. THE EFFECT OF GATES ON PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATIONS
According to Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the totality of the circumstances test was simply a return to the flexible, common sense standard developed in pre-Aguilar cases. 73 For example, in Draper v. United States, 74 the Court used the totality of the circumstances approach even though the informant had provided no basis of knowledge for his tip. The Court determined that the police verification of the details provided in the tip was sufficient to establish probable cause. 75 Both Justices White and Brennan, however, suggested 70 Id. at 2358. Justice Brennan said that the Aguilar-Spine/li rules "structure the magistrate's probable cause inquiry and, more importantly, they guard against findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything other than information which magistrates reasonably can conclude has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible person." Id. at 2357 n.6. 71 Id. at 2359. 72 Id. Justice Stevens also dissented. He pointed out that although Justice Rehnquist had stated that the Gates' behavior was indicative of a drug run, seesupra text accompanying note 54, the affidavit did not report that the Gates had done any of the things that drug couriers are noted for doing. Id. at 2360 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens was also concerned with an error in the letter. See supra note 61. He found the error significant for three reasons. First, it cast doubt on the informant's statement that the Gates had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement because, contrary to the informant's prediction, the Gates did not arrange their travels to leave one person at home to guard the drugs. Second, the discrepancy made the Gates' conduct seem less unusual since instead of driving to Florida, leaving the car and immediately returning to Bloomingdale, Susan Gates stayed and drove back with her husband. Third, the fact that the letter contained a material mistake undermined the reasonableness of relying on it to make a search of a private home. The Aguilar-Spinelli standards, although rigid, assisted magistrates' determinations of probable cause by ensuring that they issued warrants only on the basis of reliable information.
7 By adopting the totality of the circumstances test in Gates, the Court requires magistrates to consider all the information in the affidavit including the informer's reliability, credibility, and basis of knowledge and to make a practical, common sense decision whether to issue a warrant. 78 Yet, the test gives no practical guidance as to the relative weights assigned to any of these considerations. The Court stated that the strength of one consideration may compensate for a deficiency in another?
9 For example, judges and magistrates may continue to use the strength of police corroboration to overcome deficiencies in the informer's reliability or basis of knowledge.
In the past, however, the Court has been inconsistent in its treatment of corroborative evidence; 80 under the totality of the circumstances test, therefore, the standard of corroboration will require further clarification.
In Gates, the Court used Draper to support its contention that police corroboration can establish probable cause. 8 Gates may confuse judges and magistrates because it is unclear how much corroboration of innocent activity will be sufficient to establish probable cause. Moreover, several commentators have strongly suggested that corroboration of innocent activity alone is insufficient to establish probable cause.
8 9 Instead, to establish probable cause, corroborated details should be of criminal activity. Requiring corroborative details to be of criminal activity reduces the possibility that an informant is being untruthful in two situations. First, although both Draper and Spinelli involved informants known to the police, the informant in Gates was anonymous. Because the reliability and basis of knowledge of an unknown informant are difficult to determine, corroboration becomes especially important under a totality of the circumstances approach. Anonymous tips may be presumptively unreliable because the motives of an anonymous informant are unknown and therefore inherently
The tension between Draper and the. . . Aguilar line of cases is evident from the course followed by the majority opinion. First, it is held that the report from a reliable informant that Spinelli is using two telephones with specified numbers to conduct a gambling business plus Spinelli's reputation in police circles as a gambler does not add up to probable cause. This is wholly consistent with Aguilar . . . : the informant did not reveal whether he had personally observed the facts or heard them from another and, if the latter, no basis for crediting the hearsay was presented. . . . The Draper approach would reasonably justify the issuance of a warrant in this case, particularly since the police had some awareness of Spinelli's past activities. 393 U.S. at 427-28 (White, J., concurring Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would, under the view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause, we think it would not be profitable to decide. There are so many variables in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a-useful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that while we in no way abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of probable cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by some of its language. 
